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LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
union security agreements. The chief obstacle to amendment
would be the hesitancy of Congress to let the states decide in each
case what constitutes an emergency.
One certain conclusion to be drawn from the Motor Coach
Employees decision is that the states must re-examine their labor
relations policies with a view toward adoption of one which will
do most toward making voluntary collective bargaining work-
able and keeping labor-management disputes at a minimum.
Thomas J. Poche
LEVEE CONSTRUCTION-FEDERAL EXPROPRIATION
OF RIPARIAN LAND
The plaintiff's trees, which he owned separate and apart from
the land they were situated on, were destroyed by a subcontractor
repairing a levee for the federal government. The plaintiff is
seeking damages under the Tucker Act,' alleging that by destroy-
ing the trees the government impliedly contracted to reimburse
the owner for them. The decision herein was rendered on a
motion to dismiss on the grounds that the petition did not state a
cause of action. The defendant attempted to avail itself of the
Louisiana constitutional provision that there can be no recovery
from the state unless the property was assessed for taxes the
preceding year by the state and its subdivisions. 2 The court dis-
posed of the motion in favor of the -plaintiff by relying on Tilden
v. United States3 and held that the case should be tried on its
merits. General Box Company v. United States, 94 F. Supp. 441
(D.C. La. 1951).
The Tilden case, decided by this same district court, was also
to recover the value of property destroyed by the federal govern-
ment in the process of building a levee. There the court held that
the Flood Control Act,4 providing for the building of levees, "spe-
cifically provided for payment"' and the plaintiff could recover
in spite of the fact that the property had not been assessed as
required by the Louisiana Constitution of 1921 which provides
1. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1346(a) (1950). "The district courts shall have original
jurisdiction, concurrent with the Court of Claims, of: ... (2) Any other civil
action or claim against the United States, not exceeding $10,000 in amount,
founded ... upon any express or implied contract with the United States ...."
2. La. Const. of 1921, Art. XVI, § 6. "Lands and improvements thereon
hereafter actually used or destroyed for levees or levee drainage purposes,
.. shall be paid for at a price not to exceed the assessed value for the preced-
ing year; provided, that this shall not apply to batture. ..
3. 10 F. Supp. 377 (D.C. La. 1934).
4. 33 U.S.C.A. § 594 (1928).
5. 10 F. Supp. 377, 379 (D.C. La. 1934).
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for a gratuity6 to riparian landowners whose property is taken for
levee purposes and was assessed the previous year.
Originally, riparian landowners were subjected to the burden
of building and maintaining levees at their own expense by an
ordinance of the French governor in 1743, and failure to comply
with this ordinance resulted in the forfeiture of their lands to
the sovereign. In 1866 the burden of constructing and maintain-
ing levees was shifted entirely from the riparian landowners to
the state;7 however, the state retained the right to take riparian
property for levee purposes without payment. In the Louisiana
Constitution of 18988 provision was made for payment not to
exceed the value assessed the previous year to the riparian land-
owners under the jurisdiction of the Orleans Levee Board.9 In
the Louisiana Constitution of 192110 this provision was extended
to the entire state. Subsequent jurisprudence has held that the
assessment for the preceding year is a condition precedent to the
right of the landowners to recover for the state use of the servi-
tude." This is the Louisiana law which the federal government
urged in the Tilden case in an attempt to escape payment.
The court left unanswered the constitutional question 12 of
whether the federal government, in the absence of the provision
of the Flood Control Act providing for payment, could avail itself
of the state constitutional provision and pay only the assessed
value of the property taken or escape payment entirely if it had
not been assessed rather than pay the "just compensation" as
required by the United States Constitution. For the understand-
ing of this problem, it is essential to keep in mind the fact that
at the time of the Louisiana Purchase a servitude existed on the
property of all riparian landowners in favor of the public. 18
6. This description was given the payment by the court In Dickson v.
Board of Commissioners, 210 La. 121, 26 So. 2d 474 (1946).
7. La. Act 20 of 1866. See Dickson v. Board of Commissioners, 210 La. 121,
26 So. 2d 474 (1946).
8. La. Const. of 1898, Art. 312.
9. For a judicial discussion of the history of Louisiana servitudes see
Dickson v. Board of Commissioners, 210 La. 121, 26 So. 2d 474 (1946), and
Mayer v. Board of Commissioners, 177 La. 1119, 150 So. 295 (1933).
10. See note 2, supra.
11. LaCour v. Red River, Atchafalaya & Bayou Boeuf Levee District, 158
La. 737, 104 So. 636 (1925).
12. 10 F. Supp. 377, 379 (D.C. La. 1934). "Regardless of whether the govern-
ment could, under any conditions, take property upon a navigable stream for
levee purposes under the theory of necessary servitude of the civil law, with-
out paying for it, the statute now construed [Flood Control Act, 33 U.S.C.A. §§
702a-702n (1950)] clearly did not so contemplate, but specifically provided for
payment."
13. In Eldridge v. Trezevant, 160 U.S. 452, 16 S. Ct. 345, 40 L. Ed. 490 (1896),
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In Overton v. United States14 the court of claims held that
the federal government could take lands for levee purposes using
the servitude of Article 665, Louisiana Civil Code of 187015 because
of an article of the Louisiana Constitution of 189818 which con-
ferred upon the federal government the right to use this servi-
tude.
The United States Supreme Court in Kohl v. United States
17
held that the power of eminent domain possessed by the federal
government is complete in itself and cannot be enlarged nor
diminished by a state."8 In the light of this decision the court
of claims, by basing its decision upon Article 240 of the Louisiana
Constitution of 1898,1' was clearly in error in permitting the
United States to use thi servitude without payment.
The question then arises whether the federal government,
under the original Louisiana Purchase, possessed in their power
of eminent domain the right to use the Louisiana servitude with-
out payment. In the case of New Orleans v. United States20 the
United States Supreme Court held that the federal government
could not exercise any ownership at all over lands of which the
perfect ownership had been vested in the common or public use.
The court said, "The State of Louisiana was admitted into the
Union, on the same footing as the original states. Her rights of
sovereignty are the same, and by consequence, no jurisdiction of
the federal government, either for purposes of police or otherwise,
the court said, ". . . in the Territory of Louisiana before its purchase by the
United States and continuing to this time .... lands abutting on the rivers
and bayous are subject to a servitude in favor of the public ..
14. 45 Ct. Cl. 17 (1909).
15. Article 665, "Servitudes imposed for the public or common utility,
relate to the space which is to be left for the public use by the adjacent pro-
prietors on the shores of navigable rivers, and for the making and repairing
of levees, roads and other public or common works.
"All that relates to this kind of servitude is determined by the laws or
particular regulations."
16. La. Const. of 1898, Art. 240. ... The Federal government is authorized
to make such geological, topographical, hydrographical and hydrometrical
surveys and investigations within the State as may be necessary to carry into
effect the act of Congress to provide for the appointment of a Mississippi
River Commission for the improvement of said river, from the head of Passes
near its mouth to the headwaters, and to construct and protect such public
works and Improvements as may be ordered by Congress under the provisions
of said act."
17. 91 U.S. 367 (1875).
18. Id. at 374. Accord: Kincaid v. United States, 35 F. 2d 235 (D.C. La.
1929); United States ex rel. and for Use of Tennessee Valley Authority v.
Powelson; 319 U.S. 266 (1943).
19. 91 U.S. 367 (1875).
20. 35 U.S. 662 (1836).
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can be exercised over this public ground, which is not common
to the United States."'2'
From this we can assume that since the servitude on riparian
property is not common to the United States22 the federal gov-
ernment could not exercise a servitude on shores of navigable
rivers and streams that have been kept in favor of the "public"
for levee purposes. We see then that the holding of the court of
claims was correct and in line with New Orleans v. United States23
insofar as it held that the federal government could not make use
of the servitude on riparian property without the constitutional
provision of 1898,24 but they overlooked the fact that the federal
government's power of eminent domain cannot be enlarged nor
diminished by a state25 thus making Article 240 of the 1898 con-
stitution ineffective insofar as it gave the federal government the
right to exercise this servitude imposed by Article 665 of the
Louisiana Civil Code of 1870.26
In view of Article XVI, Section 6, of the Louisiana Constitu-
tion of 1921 and in view of the conclusion that the federal govern-
ment cannot avail itself of the servitude on riparian property
even if the federal statute providing for levee building did not
provide for payment,27 the riparian landowner can demand pay-
ment for his property taken for levee purposes. In the case of the
state or a state agency expropriating the property he can demand
the assessed value of the property providing it was assessed for
the previous year 28 and if the federal government makes use of
21. This case was relied on in Van Brocklin v. State of Tennessee, 117 U.S.
151 (1885), where the court held, "The rights of local sovereignty, including the
title in lands held in trust for municipal uses, and in the shores of navigable
waters below high water mark, vest in the state, and not in the United States."
And again in United States v. Illinois Central Railroad Company, 154 U.S.
225 (1893), the court relied on the New Orleans case and said, "The United
States possess no jurisdiction to control or regulate, within a State, the execu-
tion of trusts or uses created for the benefit of the public, or of particular
communities or bodies therein."
22. Board of Levee Inspectors of Chicot County v. Crittenden, 94 F. 613
(C.C.A. 8th, 1899).
23. See 91 U.S. 367 (1875).
24. See note 16, supra.
25. See note 18, supra.
26. In the Louisiana Constitution of 1921 there is no article corresponding
to Article 240 of the Louisiana Constitution of 1898; however, in the light of
the fact that the federal government's power of eminent domain cannot be
enlarged nor diminished by a state any attempt to give a state constitutional
or legislative provision such an interpretation, as the Court of Claims gave
Article 240 of the Louisiana Constitution of 1898, would be unjustified.
27. The complex legal problem of whether the federal government in
expropriating land for public use takes only a servitude or easement, or title
to the land is outside the scope of this note.
28. La. Const. of 1921, Art. XVI, § 6.
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his land he may demand a "reasonable price"29 or "just com-
pensation." 0
James A. Hobbs
MINERAL RIGHTS-RIGHT TO PARTITION-SERVITUDES CREATED
BY RESERVATION IN SALE OF LAND
Defendant bought a 4000 acre tract of land, the vendor retain-
ing one-half of the minerals. The plaintiff then bought the ven-
dor's interest and brought suit against defendant for partition,
claiming that, as owner of one-half of the minerals, he was a
co-owner with the defendant. Held, that the plaintiff owned a
complete servitude, an entire right to explore on the defendant's
land and to retain one-half of the minerals extracted, and there-
fore he was not entitled to partition. Starr Davis Oil Company
v. Webber, 218 La. 231, 48 So. 2d 906 (1950).
There is no question as to the nature of this servitude which
the plaintiff owned. The courts have repeatedly held that a sale
or reservation of the minerals in a tract of land constitutes a sale
or reservation of a right to go upon all parts of the land and to
explore for minerals and to retain the amount stipulated in the
contract.'
At the time of the sale and until minerals are actually pro-
duced from the land, there is nothing which can be the subject
of ownership by this conveyance except a right of search, with
the right to keep half of the minerals, if and when found. It is
only this right of search with which we are concerned in this
attempt to partition.
Before there can be a partition there must be co-ownership.2
Land held by co-owners may be partitioned8 either in kind or by
29. 33 U.S.C.A. § 702d (1950).
30. 33 U.S.C.A. § 595 (1950); U. S. Const., Amend. V.
1. Rives v. Gulf Refining Co., 133 La. 178, 62 So. 623 (1913). See also
Palmer Corp. v. Moore, 171 La. 774, 132 So. 229 (1930), and list of cases there.
For a more recent case see Standard Oil Co. v. Futral, 204 La. 215, 15 So. 2d
65 (1943).
2. See Daggett, Mineral Rights in Louisiana 230-46 (1949).
3. Art. 1289, La. Civil Code of 1870: "No one can be compelled to hold
property with another, unless the contrary has been agreed upon; anyone has
a right to demand the division of a thing held in common, by the action of
partition."
Art. 1308: "The action of partition will not only lie between co-heirs and
co-legatees, but between all persons who hold property in common, from
whatever cause they may hold in common."
Art. 1311: "Partitions can be sued for not only by the majority of heirs,
but by each of them, so that one heir alone can force all the rest to partition
at his instance."
Moreover, co-owners of land cannot explore for minerals on the common
